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All parties involved in this appeal are included in
this caption.

As of this date, Floyd J. Rigby, Ray all and

Rimaras, Inc. are not parties to the appeal.
is Defendant-Appellant.

Anna R. Fleischmann

Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland are

Plaintiffs and should be Respondents.
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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this appeal is from the Court of
general trial jurisdiction, to-wit:

The District Court of

Garfield County, Utah, to the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah.

The jurisdiction of this item comes from Rule D of the

Utah Rules of the Supreme Court in which it has specific
authority to appeal this item to the Utah Supreme Court.

The

final rjght is the basis on which this is appealed from the final
judgment and order effecting title of land in the State of Utah.
The appeal as a matter of right is from the Sixth Judicial
District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah, to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah under the provisions of Rule 9 (a)
of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
from is attached hereto.

A copy of the Judgment appealed

The Court turned jurisdiction of this

matter under the date of the 22nd day of December, 1988, in the
form of a pleading, "Pursuant to the authority vested in this
Court, these cases are poured-over to the Court of Appeals for
disposition.

All further pleadings and correspondence should be

directed to that Court.

Their address is 230 South 500 East,

Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102."

This pleading was

signed by Geoffrey J. Butler, as Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah.

It is presumed by the undersigned that this

pour-over by the Supreme Court oi the State of Utah to the Utah
Court of Appeals confirms jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
of the State of Utah.
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ISSUES
There are several issues presented on this particular
item, to-wit.
1.

Plaintiffs are squatters with nothing but possession

by consent of officers of the Corporation that owns the
property.
2.

The conditional sale agreement on other land is

insufficient indicia of title on which to base a quiet
title action.
3.

Can a land description in a conditional sale

contract be change by parol evidence for use as indicia
of title for a quiet title action over objection and over
the statute of frauds?
4.

What is color of title for purposes of a quiet

title action?
5.

What is seven years* taxes for purposes of a

quiet title action?
6.

Was this a permitted use rather than an adverse

use?
ST^TUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.

Title 78-12-7:
11

Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner.
In every action lor the recovery ol real property, or
the possession thereof, the person establishing a
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereot within the time required by law;
and the occupation of the property by any other person
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination
to the legal title, unless it appears that the property
has been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of the
action. "
-5-

2.

Title 78-12-7.1
1

Adverse Possession—Presumption—Proviso —
Tax title.—In every action for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title to or
deterimine the owner thereof the person establishing
a legal title to such property shall be presumed to
have been possessed thereof within the time required
by law; and the occupation of such property by any
other person shall be deemed to have been under and
in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears
that such property has been held and possessed
adversely to such legal title for seven years before
the commencement of such action. Provided, however,
that if in any action any party shall establish prima
facie evidence that he is the owner of any real
property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for four years prior to the commencement of
such action and one year after the effective date of
this amendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of
such property by adverse possession unless it appears
that the owner of the legal title or his predecessor
has actually occupied or been in possession of such
property under such title or that such tax title
owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all the
taxes levied or assessed upon such property within
such four-year period.ff
3.

Title 78-12-12.

"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—
In no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provision of any section of this
code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors
and grantors have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law."
4.

Title 78-12-5.1:

"Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso —
Tax title.—No action for the recovery of real property
or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless
the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed
such property within seven years from the commencement
of such action; provided, however, that with respect
to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property against the holder
of a tax title to such property, no such action or
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance,
-6-

or transfer creating such tax titie unless the person
commencing or interposing such action or defense or
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in
possession of such property within four years prior
to the commencement or interposition of such action
or defense or within one year i rorn the effective
date of this amendment."

This is definitely a case of statutory interpretation,
and it is a question of law.

There probably is very little

controversy as to the fact situation.
The Plaintiffs-Respondents brought this case against
several Defendants including the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann
who claims title to the land.

The second and third causes of

action were primarily damage J terns which did not apply to the
Dei'endan t-Appe L Lan t Fleischmann and were dismissed as to every
one else.

Statements were made before trial that they did not

apply to Miss Fleischmann.

Plaintiffs-Respondents claimed

title to the property based upon adverse possession on a verbal
agreement with officers of Rimaras, Inc. who did not own the
property but said that they could occupy the same in this
fashion, this is permissive use when the property belonged to
Rimaras, Inc. and was consented to by officers of Rimaras, Inc.
at the time Rimaras, Inc. owned the land.

The Defendant-

Appellant claims title and occupation upon being the successor
in interest to the record title holder by virtue of a judicial
sale.

This matter was fried before the District Court of

Garfield County, Utah, which awarded specific title to the
Plaintiffs-Respondents, with findings to the effect that said
Plaintiffs-Respondents were there by right of possession.
-7-

The

Judgment Order dated the 21st day of October, 1988, filed in the
District Court of Garfield County, Utah, on the 26th day of
October, 1988, started an appeal process with a Notice of Appeal
being filed in the District Court of Garfield County, Utah, on
the 18th day of November, 1988, and filed by the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of Utah on the 21st day of November, 1988.
From the factual situation, the Plaintiffs-Respondents
did business with Defendants Rigby and Hall in their own
capacity in 1980.

At that time, Plaintiffs-Respondents entered

into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on a printed
form.

Riby and Hall agreed to sell to Plaintiffs-Respondents

Garland Lot #126, Tommy Creek Subdivision, Garfield County, Utah.
This receipt is attached hereto or a photosat of the same.

A

photostatic copy was entered into evidence and is the nearest
to indicia of title that the Plaintiffs-Respondents can produce.
It does not say anything about Lot #128.

It says in substance

and effect Lot #126 and that Plaintiffs-Respondents may change
to Lot #127 or Lot #41.

It might be interpreted to say that any

lot between #127 and #41 could be picked by Plaintiffs-Respondents.
Lot #128 does not come under either category.

Defendants Rigby

and Hall never owned the property in question which is Lot #128.
As officers of Rimaras,Inc., Defendants Rigby and Hall obtained
title to Lot #128 in the name of Rimaras, Inc. and did not record
the deed and did not deliver the deed to Plaintiffs-Respondents
until later.

It was recorded after about one year from the time

of the transaction between Defendants Rigby and Hall and the
Plaintiffs-Respondents.

Both Defendants Rigby and Hall were

-8-

officers of Rimaras, Inc. and are now officers of Rimaras, Inc.
This was true at the time of the transaction and is true at the
present and at all times inbetween.
On the 3rd day of January, 1985, in the District Court
of Iron County, Utah, the Defendant-Appellant obtained a money
judgment against Rimaras, Inc for the sum of $17,066.12, plus
$54.50 in costs.
on that date.

A judgment was filed in Iron County, Utah,

The transcript of this judgment from Iron County,

Utah was filed in the Garfield County Clerk's office on or about
the 6th day of July, 1985.

As of that date, Lot #128 was in the

name of Rimaras, Inc. and had considerable taxes over due on the
same.

Tax notices were sent to Rimaras, Inc., and were trans-

mitted by Defendants Hall and Rigby to the Plaintiffs-Respondents
for the years 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985.

Taxes were

paid by the Plaintiffs-Respondents in the spring of 1986.

In

November, 1987, the Plaintiffs-Respondents paid the 1987 taxes
on Lot #128.

In September, 1987, the Defendant-Appellant

Fleischmann by and through her representative had execution
taken on the judgment.

The execution together with a praecipe

was sent to the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah, listing the
usual items of sale, to-wit:
property.

Personal property and then real

The praecipe specifically requested that if the

execution was not answered by other property items then the
interest of Rimaras, Inc. in Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision,
Mammoth Creek Ranchetts in Garfield County, Utah, be sold.
Garfield County Sheriff levied on Lot #128 and
noticed the same for sale on the 11th day of January, 1988, in

accordance with the statutes of the State of Utah.

On the date

of said sale, the sale was attended by Patrick H. Fenton as
attorney for Defendant-Appellant and by Michael W. Park as
attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents.

At said sale, Michael W.

Park announced that he was there as a representative of the
Plaintiffs-Respondents and that Plainti f fs-Respondents claimed
possession.

The sale went forward, and the Defendant-Appellant

Fieischmann was the bidder.
$10,000.

She purchased said Lot #128 for

Since that time, the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah,

has issued a Sheriff's Deed to the DeLendant-Appellant Fieischmann.
Said deed has been recorded due to the failure of Rimaras, Inc.
or anyone else holding title under Rimaras, Inc. to redeem.

A

Certificate of Sale was issued on the 11th day of January, 1988;
it was recorded on that date.

After the commencement of the

action, the Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann by and through her
agents ascertained that the 1986 taxes were not paid on Lot
#128, said agents for Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann paid said
taxes.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
It is the Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann?s position
that she obtained title to the property by virtue of the judicial
sale.

The Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland never had adverse

possession by and for the reason that they entered the property
believing it to be the property of the Defendants Rigby and
Hall and they wore entering WJ th their- consent.

Later when

Plaintifts-Respondents Garland iound out that it was the
property of Rimaras, Inc., they entered the property with the
consent of the Defendants Rigby and Hall, the two principal
-10-

officers of Rimaras, Inc.

Under these conditions, there can be

no adverse possession but the occupation was by consent.

This

occupation was by mistake caused by misrepresentation, but at
no time was it intentional adverse possession by PlaintiffsRespondents.

In addition, Plaintiffs-Respondents have not

complied with statutory requirements for adverse possession in
the following respects:
1.

Plaintiffs-Respondents have no indicia of title

having only a carbon copy of a conditional sale contract on
other property and not the subject property of this action.
2.

Plaintiffs-Respondents have not paid seven years1

taxes, having admittedly not paid the 1986 taxes and having paid
five years be Core that and the 1987 taxes.

The 1988 taxes were

not due at the time of trial.
Under these conditions, adverse possession has not been
met out.

Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann is entitled to the

property by virtue of the execution deed.
ARGUMENTS
1.

What is adverse possession?
In the first place to create adverse possession,

we have to overcome Title 78-12-7 which has been quoted and stated
above.

It is the Defendant-Appellant's contention that this puts

the Defendant-Appellant in possession of the property as successor
in interest of Rimaras, Inc. by virtue of an execution sale.

This

particular statute gives a presumption of the person establishing
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been
possessed thereof within the time required by law, and the occupation of such property is in subordination of this occupation of

-11-

Defendant-Appellant Fleisehmann. There is no question as to the
legal title being in the Oofondnnt-Appe11 ant Fleisehmann as is
shown in the transcript in the testimony of Thomas V. Hatch,
beginning on page 33 at line 16 of the transcript of testimony
and running through to page 38, line 21.

This shows legal title

under Rimaras, Inc. and by virtue of the sheriff's sale to the
Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann.

Under these conditions, this

puts the provisions of Title 78-12-7, Utah Code Annotated, (1953,
as amended), squarely into consideration of this particular
matter as to establishing legal title and the right of possession.
It is uncontested that legal title has been in Rimaras, Inc.
since 1982, and came into them promptly by virtue of a deed that
takes back legal title to the I960 period and ends up in
Rimaras, Inc.

By virtue of the sheriff's sale, legal title is

in the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann.

The sheriff's sale

shows in the title information, title records in the transcript,
page 37, line 22 and the remainder of that page and several pages
preceeding thereto, which shows the title to run from Mrs. Jensen
to Mr. and Mrs. Allen and a change of name on Mrs. Allen and a
deed from Mrs. Allen in her later name to Rimaras, Inc.

The

transfer irom Rimaras, Inc. to the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann
is by virtue of the sheriff's sale; this is shown on page 37
of the transcript.

The recording to Rimaras, Inc. is shown on

page 36 of the transcript, at line 6; it is shown to have taken
place on July 14, 1981.
At this time it seems appropriate that there should be
some discussion in this matter as to what is adverse possession.
-12-

In the case of Home OwnerT s Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P.2d 160,1943, there was considerable discussion on this
point.
is.

There was quite a discussion on what adverse possession

That case indicates that adverse possession can only be

acquired in accordance with the exact provisions of the statutes
requiring the adverse possession to be for a continuous period
of time during which claimant is in possession and has paid all
taxes levied and levied on that particular property.

At that

time we were talking about Title 104-2-7 to 104-2-12.

We are

now talking about Title 78-12-7 to 78-12-12, to include 78-1212.1.

These last items refer to Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as

amended.)

Adverse possession is interpreted and how it is

acquired.

It refers specifically to the statutory provisions of

adverse possession and acquiring title by such method.

Paying

taxes and items of this nature are discussed in great ramification in the Home OwnerT s Loaji__Co£P.i jy_- J^ u ^l_ e Z

case

anc

l the

various cases that have used it for authority ever since.

In

that particular case, adverse possession was allowed by the trial
court and reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
This has been held as a leading case for many years since that
time including the present time.

This case specifically limits

adverse possession to the statutory method.

It specifically

holds that the statute has to be complied with and there has to
be possession for the required period of time plus the payment
of taxes.

This doctrine was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court as

late as 1987 in the case of ^oyal__Street Land Company v. Reed,
739 P.2d 1104.

This was also upheld in the case of United Park

-13-

City Mines Company v. CI egg, 737 P.2d 173, 1987,

Cases upholding

this doctrine in the appellate court system of the State of Utah
between Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Dudley ease and the later eases
above quoted indicate approximately 30 cases as cLted in ShepardTs
Citations.
2.

There was never any adverse possession.

It is admitted by all parties at all times that officers
of Rimaras, Inc. had actual knowledge to the occupation of the
premises by the Plaintiffs-Respondents and consented to the same.
Under these conditions, there can be no adverse possession
where you have conented occupation and this is known by all
parties.

Exhibit #3, as identiJied by the Plaintiffs-Respondents

was a conditional sale contract for other property although it
was signed by Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby.

This is claimed by the

Plaintiffs-Respondents to be their indicia oi title and is the
only item that has been olJered as indicia oi title.

It refers

to Lot #127 or in the alternative, Lots #127 or #41.

To torture

this into saying Lot #128 is allowing us to change a written
agreement by parol testimony and is in violation of the statute
of frauds.

This was objected to at the time on that basis.

Page

10 of the transcript shows that the agreement is identified as
Exhibit #3, which is apparently a carbon copy of a conditional
sales contract, describes Lot #127.

Further on Page 10 commenc-

ing on line 19, there is talk about changing it.

There seems

to be no question that Mr. Hall, Mr. Rigby and the PlaintiffsRespondents d ] ci make some verbal agreement pertaining to Lot
#128.

However, they did not change the written agreement.

-14-

Through Page 11 of the transcript there is discussion of this
and reference is made as to the statute ot frauds on line 10
oi Page 11.

On page 13 commencing with line 3, over objection

the Plaintiffs-Respondents were allowed to testify that they
talked to Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby about changing lots to Lot
#128 with the consent ot Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby.

Mr. Rigby

actually cleared the area and the cabin was built within the
next year or two.

It was PIaintiffs-Rospondonts' interpretation

that they were building on Lot #128 and that this was what they
were going to get.

In their opinion this was also the inter-

pretation of Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby who were officers of
Rimaras, Inc., the corporation who actually owned the property.
Exhibits #2 and #3 that were identil led, beginning on Page 14,
line 3, were entered into evidence.

Said Exhibit #2 was a letter

from Mr. Hall to Mr. Garland to which was attached a copy of a
Deed, Exhibit #3, from Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby to Mr. Garland of
Lot #128.

The letter stated something to the effect that we

have sent these to be recorded and in due course of time, the
recorder will send them to you.

At that time there is no question

that Higb\ and Hall wore ollieers oI Rimaras, Inc.

Under those

conditions, any occupation under the theory of permission by Mr.
Hall and Mr. Rigby was a consented occupation and was not
adverse possession.

Although it is quite plain that Mr. Hall

and Mr. Rigby got a deed to Rimaras, inc. to Lot #128 in 1981,
they did not record the same until 1982.

At no time have Mr.

Hall and/or Mr. Rigby owned the property.

At all times they

have been officers of Rimaras, Inc.

-15

Under these conditions, with

their consent to occupy the property, it cannot be adverse
possession but is permitted possession.

The Plaintiffs-

Respondents Garland had actual knowledge of Rimaras, Inc.'s
interest and the parties involved in the same about the 31st
day of January, 1986, and possibly earlier.

In the transcript,

Page 36, line 12 to line 16, Plaintiffs-Respondents admit that
they knew then that the property was in the name of Rimaras,
Inc.

And since they did not know that it belong to Rimaras,

Icn. until that time, the possession could not be adverse until
that time inasmuch as prior to that time and after that time,
they occupied the property with the consent of the principal
officers of Rimaras, Inc.

It can never be adverse.

In an older case in thee State of Utah, quoted in
Restatement of Property, Section 458, Page 2933, In paragraph J,
in discussing the open and notorious use and the special relationship of the same for adverse possession, the following
statement is found:
"Where a user of land and one having an
interest affected by the use have a
relationship to each other sufficient in
itself to justify the use, the use is not
adverse unless knowledge of its adverse
character is had by the one whose interest
is affected. The responsibility of bringing this knowledge to him lies upon the
one making the use."
In this particular instance, this was not adverse possession,
it was permitted use inasmuch as the agents of the owner knew that
it was going on.

The adverse user, if there was one, had no

knowledge that it was an adverse use until the last three years,
and Rimaras, Inc. consented thereafter because Plaintiffs-16-

Respondents expected the officers ot the corporation to clear
up their title even whey they found out that they had no title
to the lot in question.
3.

No iiulici a of title.

Whenever we get into this question of statutory
adverse possession, we still have to answer the question oi what
is indicia of title.

Under the cases that discuss this are

Lach v, Deseret Batik, 74(5 P. 2d 802.

This case did require that

the earesf money agreement pertain to the land in question.

This

is a question of a valid earnest money agreement describing the
property in question that was in existence long before the
judgment lien came up.

In the instance case, we do not have

this, as Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland's earnest money agreement was for other property.

Pertaining to Lot #128, if they

had any earnest money agreement whatsoever, it was a verbal
agreement between Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland and the officers
of Rimaras, Inc. acting in an individual capacity.
only a verbal agreement.

There was

This Court must decide whether or not

it can change the terms of an earnest money agreement by parol
evidence to make it apply to different property
it was used in the Deserejt _Bank case.

and use it as

In the Deseret Bank

case it obtained judgment liens as set forth in Title 78-22-1,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended.)

In the case oi^

Kartchner v. State Tax Commission and Wyatt, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294
P.2d 790, which is the case Judge Tibbs relied upon after having
been reversed on the Lach v. Deseret Bank case quoted above,
which is the case that establishes that indicia of title may be

-17-

a non-recorded sale contract.

This varies from the case at bar

by and for the reason that the Kartcdiner sale contract was for
property on whjch the judgment lien affixed.

In the case at bar,

the conditional sale contract is not on the property in question,
it is on different property; only by torturing the same in
violation of the statute of frauds and to say that the verbal
transaction is to be upheld can you uphold Judge Tibbs T
in the instant case.

decision

In addition to the Kartchner case used to

reverse Judge Tibbs on the bach v. Deseret Rank case, the case
at bar brings in another point entirely away from these two
cases.

That is the question that complies with the statute, the

question of
additional

the conditional sale contract, and in addition, an
point that Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland had not

paid the taxes.

The 1986 taxes had not been paid until 1988

by an agent of the Defendant-Appellant

Fleischmann.

Plaintiffs-

Respondents Garland have not paid them yet nor have they
tendered them.

fn the Kartchner case there was a deed which

predated the judgment lien that had not been recorded.

This

was amplified in the case of Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, in
relation to a divorce.

The* deed was made and

event, it was not recorded.

lost.

In any

In the Lu n d[_v. J^nijnie case,

it was held that it did not produce .judgment lien because
the property had already been transferred.

In the case at bar,

we have no instrument in existence as between PlaintiffsRespondents Garland and anyone else at anytime that describes
the land in question.

To uphold Judge Tibbs

in the case at bar,

the Appellate Court must take the position that any verbal transaction is ahead of the judgment lien, and that the statutes
-18-

have been followed even though the taxes have not been paid.

The

best we can say about Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland is that they
were squatters.
4.

Taxes must be paid.

The payment of taxes encompasses statutory and case
interpretation and goes back directly to Title 78-12-12, Utah
Code Annotated, (1953, as amended,) which has previously been
set forth verbatim herein, to the efiect that taxes must be
paid.

In no case shall adverse possession be considered

established under the provision of any section ot this code
unless it shal] be shown that the land has been occupied and
claimed continuously and that the parties, their predecessors
and grantors have paid alJ taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law.
Under the conditions of this particular title, we come
to the question of the payment ot the 1986 taxes.

On cross-

examination, Plaintiff-Respondent Mr. Garland admitted that he
found out the taxes were delinquent in the spring of 1986, having been told so by agents of Rimaras, Inc., to-wit:
and Mr. Rigby.

Mr. Hall

He made some sort of contact and paid for the

five-year period including 1981-1985 inclusive.

This was in

the spring of 1986, immediately prior to the May, 1986 tax sale.
Upon examination, he admitted that he had not paid the 1986
taxes although he probably did not know about it and he did
not know he had not paid them until the question was raised in
cross-examination.
only.

In November, 1987, he paid the 1987 taxes

He admitted that he had not paid the 1986 taxes, and the

testimony of Mrs. Judy Henrie, Garfield County Treasurer confirmed
-19-

this:

She testified that Defendant-Appellant Miss Anna R.

Fleischmann through an agent had paid the 1986 taxes.
This brings us to the question of what does Title 78-1212 mean when it talks about payment of taxes for the seven-year
period.

This has been decided many times by the Supreme Court

of the State of Utah.

The case of United Park City Miners

Company v. Clegg, 737 P.2d 173, decided March 31, 1987, to the
effect that it means payment of taxes, an adverse possession
suit such as this Garland case at bar was brought.
court did not find adverse possession.
Utah affirmed the judgment.

The trial

The Supreme Court of

It was found that the taxes assessed

on mining claims were jointly on the service on the underground
and that adverse possession mean nothing without the payment of
taxes.

On Page 175 of the report is a quote, M aLl taxes which

have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law."
Under these circumstances, until even on mining claims there can
be an assessment of the underground and the surface, the law
is applicable according to the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah in 1987.

One of the head notes makes a finding of the

Court as follows:
M

6.

Adverse Possession:
One who seeks to acquire title to
real property, other than by conveyance, must comply precisely with
statutory requirements for doing so.

What this means to the case at bar is that until the statute
has been complied with there is no way to get title except by
conveyance and there has been no conveyance.
20-

5.

Definition of Color of Title.

OflentJmos when we are talking about color of title
and items of this nature, we wonder what we mean.

There is a

quote in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 2, Adverse Possession,
Section 62, Pages 581 and 582, in the last paragraph of this
Section on Page 582, the following statement appears:
Registered assurance of title necessary
to perfect a title by adverse possession
is not shown by a deed which fails deiinitely to include the land claimed.
The above quoted case of Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, found that color of title had to be
based upon some sort of a written instrument.
Corp. v. Dudley case states to require color of
payment of taxes within the statutory period.
that this method was exclusive.

This Home OwnerT s
title required
This case upheld

To uphold adverse possession,

the taxes must be paid during the statutory period.

In addition,

it held that the color of title had to be based upon some sort of
a written instrument.

Putting improvements on adjoining land

took place to that owned by the quiet title Plaintiff and was
performed by quiet title Plaintiff and the Court held this was
not sufficient for a quiet title action without some sort of an
indicia of title and without the payment of taxes.

The Court

held that the statutory method of proving adverse possession
was exclusive.

In Peterson v. Weber County, 99 Utah 281, 103

P.2d 652, it was held that a tax deed was sufficient for color
of title even though there were technical defects in the same
and it was used as indicia of title or color of title.

In

the discussion of that particular case, there is considerable
-21-

discussion as what is meant by color of title or something of
that nature, and the term is finally used by the Court at that
time as, "apparent title."

We do not have anything of that

nature in the case at bar.
The current change that the Kartchner case quoted
above, 4 Utah 2d, 382, 294 P. 2d 790; Luind_y\ ^on^lhue[, 674 P. 2d
107; and Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, being Court of
Appeals' case, says pertaining to the color of title, may be
warranty deed or something of this nature.

It states to the

effect that it still has to be in existence although it may not
have to have been recorded.
at bar.

These previous cases cover the case

There was no color of title in the case at bar as to the

land in question although there was apparently discussions and
possibly agreements to change it.

This puts us right back to

the old case of South Pacific v. Tarpey , 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554,
to the effect that "one that has a contract and no conveyance
cannot prevail in adverse possession, and possession before
conveyance does not count on adverse possession."

In the later

cases, it states that you have to have a contract and that you
do not have to have a conveyance.

Possibly it goes as far as to

say that the contract does not have to be recorded; however, it
does have to be in existence.

This brings us to the question:

Without a written contract describing the property and nothing
that described the property and without payment of taxes, can
adverse possession be granted?

-22-

C()NCLtISION

As the conclusion on this matter, the only item that
can be drawn is that as pertaining to Lot #128, Tommy Creek
Subdivision, Mammoth Creek Hanchetts in GariieLd County, Utah,
this is now the property of De t'endant-Appel 1 ant Miss Anna R.
Eleischmann by virtue of the judgment sale by which the
interest of Rimaras, Inc., which was the complete interest
at that IJ me, was sold to her.

This is now past the time of

redemption.
Although Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland built a home
on the property, he did so with consent and under the belief
that the property belonged to Defendants Rigby and Hall who
allowed him to do it; they were not in anyway in the frame
o1 mind that it was adverse.

In addition, Plaintiffs-

Respondents have failed to make out questions of adverse
possession even if they did have indicia of title by the
failure to pay taxes.
land

is not

A conditional sales contract on other

indicia ol title.

Under these conditions, the lirst possession is

nxJTT/^'

made out in the proper forms to Miss Anna R. Eleischmann,
De fendant-Appellant.
DATED this

/ <Viay of January, 1988.

KespecfuJly

submitied,

PATRICK H. FENTGN 1
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann
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MICHAEL W. PARK (2516)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 N. Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6532
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT G. GARLAND and
MARY GARLAND,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

vs.
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL,
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and ANNA R.
FLEISCHMANN,

Civil No. 86-431

Defendants,
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R.
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton
and

the

Court

having

Y ^arc1 the

having reviewed the exh

testimony

of

the parties

and

its and having heard the arguments of

counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDEREI

ADJUDGED AND DECREED that title to the

following described property located in Garfield County, State of
Utah is hereby quieted

i.

favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary

Garland and against Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Anna R.
Fleischmann and Ray Hall.

Said property is located in Garfield

County, State of Utah and more particularly described as follows:
All of Lot 128 MAMMOTH CREEK RANCHETTS, TOMMY CREEK UNIT 1,
a subdivision, according to the Official Plar thereof,
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of said
County,
Rimaras,

Inc.,

a Utah

Corporation,

Ray

Hall

and Anna

R.

Fleischmann have no interest in said property.
DATED this

day of October, 1988.
DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on the 13th day of October, 1988,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class,
postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North
lain Street, Cedar City, UT

84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP

& RONNOW, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, UT ^84720.
/

Secretar

MICHAEL W. PARK (2516)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
110 N. Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6532
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT G. GARLAND and
MARY GARLAND,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

VS.

)

FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL,
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and ANNA R.
FLEISCHMANN,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 86-431

)
on

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing

Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R.
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton
and

the

Court

having

heard

the testimony

of

the parties

and

having rev; ./ed the exhibits and having heard the arguments of
counsel, now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1.
from

The Cc rt finds that the Plaintiff purchased

Floyd

Rigby

and

Ray

Hall

in

the

area

property

of Mammoth

Creek

Estates, pursuant to a certain earnest money receipt and offer to
purchase.

The Court

finds that the Plaintiffs were given the

option to take a different lot in the Tommy Creek Subdivision and

Plaintiffs examined

the premises and exercised their option to

purchase lot #128.
2.

The

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiffs

possession of lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision
purchased

a cabin kit

from

went

into

in 1981 and

Floyd Rigby or Ray Hall

and put a

cabin on lot #128.
3.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs were

possession
Plaintiff

of

said

became

cabin

ill

and

on

a regular

could

not go

basis

in physical

until

to the

high

1986

when

altitudes

because of said illness.
4.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs received a letter

from Ray Hall on January 21, 1981, together with a copy of a deed
and the Defendant, Ray Hall said in his letter that the warranty
deed would be recorded and that the seller, at that time was Ray
Hall and Floyd Rigby.
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff did not take further

action until there was notice

hat a Sheriff f s sale would be held

on the 11th day of January, 19fc8 and said Sheriff's sale was for
lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision.
6.

The Court 1 : nds

property for the year
7.

that the Plaintiff paid taxes on the

19°

The Court finds

.382, 1983, 1984 and 1985.
nat the Plaintiff paid the taxes for

the year 1987 and that th<

Ltorney for Anna R, Fleischmann paid

the taxes for the year 19 J .
8.

The

Fleischmann

Court

fi ds

obtained a

that

the

attorney

for

Anna

R.

JC rment against Rimaras Inc., and filed

said judgment of record on

he 8th day of July, 1985.

9.

The

Court

finds

that

the

property

was

noticed

for

Sheriff's sale on January 11, 1988 and that the attorney for Anna
R. Fleischmann and the attorney for Plaintiffs attended said sale
and the attorney for Plaintiffs put Fleischmanns on notice that
the Plaintiffs claimed that they owned all of lot #128 and the
cabin situated thereon and Fleischmann was put on notice, through
her attorney, prior to the time of the Sheriff's sale.
10.

The Court finds that the Sheriff's sale took place and

the Sheriff's deed was issued to Fleischmann on July 12, 1988.
11.

The Court finds that on November 11, 1987, that Floyd

Rigby wrote to Plaintiffs and told him that he would give Mr.
Garland

a warranty

deed

from

Rimaras,

Inc.,

to Mr.

& Mrs.

Garland, if Mr. Garland would pay certain amounts requested by
Mr. Rigby as set forth in the letter.

The Court finds that Mr.

Garland refused to pay that amount.
12.

The Court finds that the record title is in the name of

Mrs. Anna R. Fleischmann, pursuant to a Sheriff's deed and that
possession of the property is in the Plaintiffs.
13.

The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., is in default and

asserts no ownership interest in said property and that Ray Hall,
through

his

attorney,

Willard

R.

Bishop,

does

not

claim

an

ownership interest in said property.
14.

The Court finds that the case of Kartchner v. State Tax

Commission,

294 P.2d

the Defendant, Anna R.

790, (Utah 1956) is controlling and that
Fleischmann purchased whatever

interest

Rimaras owned in lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision at Sheriff's
sale.

15.
ownership

The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., did not have any
interest

in

the

property

sale was made.
16.

at the

time

the

Sheriff's

;

The Court finds that to hold otherwise would shock the

Court and that it would be patently unfair to deliver the real
property and the cabin to the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact the Court concludes
that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment quieting

title to

said property in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants
Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras Inc., and Ray Hall.
DATED this

day of October, 1988.
DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do he : jy certify that on

the 13th day of October, 1988,

I ma. led a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class,
postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North
Main Stre«
& R0NN0W,

Cec. ar City, UT

84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP

.0. Box 279, Cedar City, UT
.
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WARRANTY DEED
of
Cedar City
CONVEY and WARRANT

FLOYD J . RIGBY and R. W. HALL
grantor
, County of
Iron
, State of Utah, hereby
to

ROBERT G. GARLAND and MARY GARLAND, His Wife
of

grantee
for the sum of
-DOLLARS,

Henderson, Nevada
$10.00 and other valuable consideration

the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

County,

Iron

All of Lot-# 128, TOWY CREEK SUBDIVISION,

WITNESS, the hand
January

of said grantor

Signed in the Presence of

day of

20th

, this
, A. D. 19 81

T7ToK\V177

TIo

"N. Hall

/77^'

fir*

.* \

"— l^T^Ti•J—w

H\ fj, /* M

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

™N

On the
20th
day of
personally appeared before me
the signer
same.

January

, A. D. 19 81

FLOYC J . RI^.Y AND R. W. KALL
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledge, to me that they executed the
/
//

V

^l,,J':^ d'Mf*'.
/ Notary Public.
My coinnmnion expires.
rtLxH*

~ »o t

«tnt t)iii>-

4-12-83
OaiMrto

ro —

-Ucsidintf in.

X
OS

Cedar City,/(jtah 84720

